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Introduction
When I arrived for fieldwork in Rome, in early 2008, I was seeking to track
and  interview  the  ex-  militants  of  the  fascism-inspired  ‘Spontaneista
groups’.  Active  in  the  late  70s,  these  had  been  very  violent  and  had
claimed to be ‘neither left nor right’. Their name made reference to the
supposed  ‘spontaneity’  of  their  constitution  and  action,  announcing  an
ideological predilection of instincts and drives over reason and thought. All
of these movements had a short life of four to six years between the late
70s and the early 80s. I was then very surprised when – on my arrival in
Rome – I ran into a crowd of students, dressed in black and with shaved
heads,  rallying against  the reform of lower education and crying in  the
streets the slogan: ‘Non rossi, né neri, ma liberi pensieri’.1
Proclaiming  somewhat  similar  statements,  the  Italian  Movimento  5
Stelle (5 Stars Movement), initiated by the public figure Beppe Grillo and
the internet consultant Gianroberto Casaleggio, has col-lected an increasing
amount of  votes,  up to  the point  it  has  recently become Italy’s  second
largest party. Grillo, who previously had a successful career as a political
satirist,  was  known  for  his  polem-ics  against  the  entire  political
establishment  but  –  in  a  country  in  which  any  criticism  of  power  has
almost always come from the left – his critiques were also relegated to that
side  of  the  political  spectrum.  This  perception  changed  when  Grillo’s
Vaffanculo-Day, 8 September 2007,2 collected around 1 million Italians
protesting against  corruption,  moral  decay,  and  tax  evasions  of  Italian
politi-cians from left and right. Grillo has recently been able to gain strong
electoral  momentum by pumping up the volume of his  accusations and
extending  his  attack  to  the  European  Union’s  politics  and  insti-tutions,
making statements against illegal immigrants and claiming that ‘popular
sovereignty’ has been stolen from the people by the politicians.
Also recently, the so-called ‘Rakes Movement’ has raised claims even
more angrily against – generally – any institutional target. Once again, the
EU, the government and ‘the politicians’ from the left and the right were
under attack. It started as a spontane-ously gathered group of ‘desperate
farmers, petty entrepreneurs, artisans: an impoverished middle class, held
together by the only common denominator of not being able to “take it [the
crisis] any more”’ (Marco Revelli, Il Manifesto, 12.12.13). One spokesman
of this group claimed that ‘… the Agency of Revenue has to be closed,
high finance forbidden, the Euro erased’. Moreover, they asked ‘for the
Government to fall, and [for] all of the public institutions to be disbanded:
the Parliament, the President of the Republic, and every other institution all
along’ (cit. in Gigante, Il Giornale, 10.12.2013).
All of these recent spontaneous claims sound significantly simi-lar to
formulations I encountered while studying the Spontaneista groups of the
70s. Stretching analysis a bit further, the constitution of similar ideological
forms seems to have appeared even before on the European public arena.
This  was  at  the  dawn  of  the  last  century,  with  the  ensemble  of  anti-
materialist intellectuals that Sternhell has described as the ‘generation of
1890’  (1997:  ix–lxxx):  Gustave  Le  Bon,  Pareto,  Mosca  and  Sorel  all
participated in the constitution of an intellectual debate, a part of which
eventually concretized politi-cally in the Fascist regime.
A  common  feature  of  these  historically  diverse  experiences  is  the
recurrent anti-rationalist element of the discourse: a primacy of action and
instinct that  is constantly reasserted over reason and thought.  The latter
oppositional dichotomy is generally part of a larger critical discourse about
the  state,  seen  as  a  promoter  of  insti-tutional  rationality,  which  is
considered to be bad. Specifically, the praise of unrational forces is used to
sustain the idea that the politi-cal articulation of diverse social interests into
left/right alignments is nothing but a spurious rationalistic mystification. In
this  view,  institutional  blocks  identifying  with  left  or  right  ideologies
would only be superficial distinctions disguising the fact that there is only
one interest: the concern of the political class (working together as a social
class) for its self-preservation, and the conservation of its own privileges.
Thus,  one  should  reject  all  of  the  declinations  of  politics  provided  by
instituted politicians and situate oneself ‘beyond left and right’.3
Finally, and as a consequence of what is stated above, the practi-tioners
of this ‘post-ideological turn’ often end up claiming to rep-resent the voice
of ‘the people’ against a corrupted and globalized political establishment
that is not aware anymore of what happens underneath its cosmopolitan
stratosphere (Friedman 2003; Mouffe 2005; Kalb 2011). What are, then,
the social and political conditions in which these ideological formations
tend  to  emerge,  take  direction  and  shape?  Is  there  a  specific  set  of
structural variations that we can possibly identify across time, and relate to
the emergence of these specific discourses? One common feature stands
out quite clearly if we look at the historical circumstances in which those
groups and discourses emerged: they all happened in a time of significant
crisis and transformation of the established left.
If the beginning of last century was the period marked by the decline of
the hopes Marxism had raised in the late nineteenth cen-tury, the late 70s
are  characterized  in  a  similar  way by  the  hopes  the  Italian  Communist
Party (PCI hereafter) had fomented. But when in 1976 the PCI eventually
managed to accede to the governmental arena by supporting a Christian
Democrat4 Cabinet, the expecta-tions of a positive transformation were left
without answer. Less than one year after, it was the beginning of the so
called ‘move-ment of 1977’, when spontaneously constituted groups and
movements  started  a  radical  contestation  of  the  whole  political  system,
making little  distinction between left  and right.  Even if  we look at  the
emergence  of  more  recently  constituted  political  formations  like
Movimento 5 Stelle, or the Blocco Studentesco, we will notice how they all
established themselves as relevant political phenomena between 2007 and
2008, just when the second left-wing government of the last forty years
was turning out to be completely disappoint-ing, once again, with regards
to the expectations it had raised. It would thus appear that some kind of
structural relation binds the crisis of the left to the emergence of political
reactions that claim to be ‘post-ideological’. But –we should ask – what are
the  under-pinnings  of  this  failure,  and  how  does  the  latter  come  to
transform the logics and mechanisms of ideological production within a
given political arena?
The following chapter aims to focus on the historical experi-ence of the
‘Spontaneista’  groups  I  studied  in  Rome,  and  attempts to  isolate
generalizable features that could help us understand the constitutive logics
of movements that claim to be ‘neither left nor right’. I will try to show
how fundamental transformations in the composition of the labour force
and  class  structure  in  Italy  per-versely  interacted  with  changes  in  the
instituted political sphere and in the mechanisms of political representation,
in ways that dra-matically changed the reproduction of ideologies within
the social space. More specifically, I will show how the overgrowth of a
post-industrial  middle  class  corresponded  to  a  process  of  alienation/
marginalization of other subjects and groups in the public sphere.
Somehow similarly to what Lazar has indicated (this volume), I will use
Chantal Mouffe’s work to show how the removal of class from the political
world  operated  by  ‘Third  Way’  postulations  tends  to  be  answered  by
grassroots feelings of outrage and indignation. It is perhaps not by chance
that  –  in  these  two  cases  –  these  mobiliza-tions  are  qualified  as
‘spontaneous’.  The  redrafting  of  social  mobi-lizations  as  ‘spontaneous’
seems to  rechannel  frictions  and tensions  that  emerged  in  the  midst  of
conflicting class interests into a mor-ally defined frame, and to ‘naturalize’
them. Here, nature is resur-gent against culture and reason, since the crisis
of  class  politics  is  also  the  crisis  of  the  rationalities  that  animated  its
emergence, late in the nineteenth century.
Overall, I will try to show how the decline of the left and the rise of
‘Third Way’ politics tends to transform political idioms into moral ones,
thereby eroding the egalitarian presuppositions of political representation,
and  reorganizing  the  ways  in  which  differ-ence  is  reproduced  in  the
political arena.
‘The Limits of Growth’: Austerity, Clientelism and the
Transfer of Economic Distress to the Political Realm
If the two years of 1968 and1969 had inaugurated – as it is known – one of the
longest lasting and most violent and powerful mobilization cycles in the whole
of the West, the oil crisis of 1973 would have hit even harder and imposed a
structural, irreversible change to the functioning logics of the Italian political
system as a whole. Only a few years before, in 1969, man had set foot on the
moon, moulding an imagination of expansion of mankind into the universe,
which seemed to have no limits. In 1973 the oil crisis would suddenly show a
shockingly  different  reality.  Italy’s  situation  was,  by  the  way,  worse  than
anywhere else in Europe, since as other countries  had already implemented
restrictive economic policies, Italy was then trying to sustain production
and growth with inflation and devaluation of its currency (Tarrow 1979;
Crainz 2003: 438–39).  In  this  situation,  the combined impact of further
inflation and general economic stagnation was meant to be devastating.
Austerity  was  only  the  immediate  issue  of  this  conjuncture.  Class
conflict  was  –  quite  obviously  –  another  immediate  one,  although  it
unfolded in ways, as we shall see, that ended up eroding the ‘class’ part of
it.  A deeper and more structured way to look at  it,  however,  is  to  pay
attention to changes that were occurring in class structure. More precisely,
with an observer of the day, I would point at the articulation between the
transformations of the labour force in Italy and the paralysis of the political
class as the epicentre of the Italian crisis (Foa 1976: 259–60).
As it is known, after the constitution of early industrial centres in the late
nineteenth century, production in Italy nearly did not evolve until the aftermath
of World War II. Then, the reopening of global markets, the demand of goods
for the postwar reconstruction all over Europe and the European Recovery Plan
sponsored by the United States ignited a vertiginous growth that transformed a
substantially underdeveloped country into one of the industrial powers of the
late twentieth century. This sudden expansion, however, did come at a price.
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, a large majority of the labour force was
transferred from agricultural to industrial produc-tion, undergoing a significant
urban drift, and sustaining massive migration flows, both internal and external
to the country. On one hand, these processes produced a massive reservoir of
cheap labour, the winning factor of the industrial boom. On the other hand, this
also created – through processes that seem similar to the Marxian primitive
accumulation  –  pockets  of  uprooted  and  alienated  popula-tions,  whose
presence would help the capitalist classes to keep com-petition high and labour
force  costs  low.  The divisions between  the  established  class  of  specialised
workers and the new army of cheap, uprooted, unqualified workers produced
the margination of the latter,  especially in small-medium towns (Barbarano
1979: 188).
Simultaneously, the 60s and 70s saw the emersion and consolida-tion of
a so-called ‘middle class’ (Sylos Labini 1974), based on the upward social
mobility  that  ‘the  miracle’  had  sustained  and  on  the  progressive
tertiarization of the economy. Part of this process was politically driven. As
noted by Filippo Barbarano, municipal poli-cies allowed the formation of a
middle  class  of  self-employed  small  retailers  and  shopkeepers,  by  the
generous  concession  of  licences, de-taxation  and  economic  incentives.
Abundant were – also at the municipal level  – the policies successfully
triggering  petty  real  estate  rent  and  the  formation  of  rentier  classes
(Cervellati 1976).
Lastly,  a  number  of  observers  have  described  the  formation  (and  later
overgrowth)  of  an  unproductive  middle  class,  whose  employ-ment  in  the
public sector was generally driven by clientelistic logics of preservation of the
block of power and of the social peace, rather than by actual administrative
needs (Barbarano 1979: 190; Lanaro 1992: 340; Pizzorno 1997: 307). This was
a politics that exploded throughout the 70s, partly as a means of the Christian
Democratic Party to control social conflict and preserve its electoral basis. As
noted  by  Donolo,  ‘the  mediation  within  [different  segments  of]  its  own
constituency became one of the main activities [of the Christian Democratic
Party] and progressively sabotaged the capability of the whole political system
to take governmental decisions’ (1977: 11–12).
This overgrowing political/administrative personnel (Crainz 2003: 420)
started to function as a social class in its own right, and reproduced itself
thanks to the power to ‘control the distribution of public funding, decide
appointments, entrust enterprises with con-tracts, and strengthen clienteles’
(Pizzorno 1997: 307). Especially this last segment of the emerging Italian
middle class will play a major role materially, and most of all symbolically,
in the fractures within which the conflicts, disputes and struggles that are
the subject of this chapter eventually unfolded. The emersion of a class of
privileged public servants, seen as the product of political clientelism and
ben-efiting from the latter, could do nothing but raise anger during years in
which economic certainties  were disintegrating and a future of progress
suddenly seemed to disappear to the many. In this context, the traditional
sociological frame of working classes and bourgeoi-sie appeared to start
giving way to new dichotomies. The expand-ing domain of the precarious
workers, unemployed youth, dropouts and students, who could not see a
professional  future  coming,  was  developing  the  feeling  not  to  be
represented any more by the political class, and they were harbouring their
indignation at the margins of the political arena.
Parricide in the ‘Old Left’
In 1977, turmoil  in Italy was higher than ever because of a cycle of social
mobilizations,  which  started  in  1968  and  would  not  stop  (Tarrow  1989;
Ferraresi  1996;  Sommier  2008;  Ventrone  2012).  Particularly,  as indicated
before, tensions multiplied within the left as the Communist Party almost
won the general elections of 1976, ending up with the endorsement of a
Christian  Democrat  Government.  PCI  had  never  been  even  close  to
governmental power, and the actual need for its votes to support the DC
cabinet was regarded as a great  occasion for the left  to  eventually start
wielding a positive influence over the administration of the country. The
reformist attitude of the PCI had been raising hopes that – eventually –
even the interests of the lower classes could be represented. Unfortunately,
the government proved unable to create the radical inversion of a trend
many had hoped for. On the contrary, it ended up ‘burying the hopes of
transformation, and making clear that the country could not go back from
the  ongoing  process  of  degeneration  and  decline  of  public  enterprise’
(Crainz 2003: 545).
Within this context, a symbolic and devastating rupture within the left was
produced by the events of La Sapienza – the main uni-versity of Rome – on 17
February  1977.  There,  the  general  secretary  of  Confederazione  Generale
Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL), the major general union, which was endorsed by
the Communist Party, was chased away by leftist militants after a long scuffle
with the security service of the union and PCI. As reported by one witness, a
‘parricide  was  almost  materially  consumed  when  the  general  secretary  of
CGIL union Luciano Lama – one of the most powerful figures of the work-
ing-class movement – got expelled from the University of Rome. Just a few
months before, this would have been an almost unimaginable act: something
that was breaking into pieces  all of the taboos and credos of working class
mythology’ (Annunziata 2007: 4).
The episode itself was bound to change the historicity of the Italian 70s:
an  ‘event’  –  as  defined  by  Alban  Bensa  and  Eric  Fassin  (2002)  –
representing a ‘rupture in intelligibility’, changing the prin-ciples through
which  reality  is  interpreted  and  understood  in  the  everyday.  This
foundational rupture was probably creating an irre-versible split between
the developmentalist and institutional left embodied by PCI – on the one
side – and what started then to be known as ‘the movements’ (note the
plural): grassroots, anti-insti-tutional and often culturalist formations on the
extreme left.5
The fragmented scene that emerged from the latter breakup was based
on the  original  divide  between those  who thought  they  could  sustain  a
project of social reformation, and those who had lost that belief and aimed
at transformation by a radical rupture with the present. Within this context,
the idea of an armed struggle, which would trigger a revolutionary process,
gained legitimacy in the later part of the decade, and some of the militants
of the aforementioned groups ended up joining armed organizations like
the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) and – later on – Nuclei Armati Proletari
(NAP – Proletarian Armed Squads) or Prima Linea (Front Line).
While it is clear that the ‘Lama episode’ was the historical epicen-tre
that changed the historicity and the logics of political reproduc-tion of the
Italian left, it may be less obvious that the latter ‘rupture’ within the left
was crucial also in generating powerful ideologi-cal transformations of the
extreme right in the following years. It was after that ‘event’ that many
political actors, historically rooted within either left or right social spheres,
started questioning the ‘left/right’ horizontal configuration of the political
spectrum. As an alternative, the political space was reconfigured through
the verti-cal opposition between those who identified with the institutional
order and those who did not.
It could also be argued that the emergence of the Italian ‘New Right’ has
often been poorly understood because left-wing academ-ics were reluctant,
out of ‘moral’ prejudice, to connect it directly to the crisis of the old left.
To  our  spatially  organized  minds,  left  and  right  are  radically  distant
phenomena, and – in a very Douglasian way – we are not keen to accept
any kind of mutual contamination (Loperfido 2013). Yet, there is abundant
evidence. One of my former Spontaneista informants, Biagio Cacciolla, has
been a central figure in the effort of younger generations of the right to
claim a direct connection between the ‘Lama episode’ and the new course
of their ideology. As a matter of fact, he has gotten as far as claiming to
have been an active party in the confrontations between the leftist move-
ments and the security service of the PCI/CGIL.
The presence of extreme right militants on 17 February 1977 was never
confirmed, but what is interesting is the will of a young right-wing leader
to identify with a major turnaround moment of the left,  and – also – to
rhetorically mark that moment as a point of genesis, the beginning of a new
way of being a right-winger.
In May 1977, I gave an interview to the newspaper L’Espresso, where I was alluding
to the fact  that  I  –  all  together  with other  people  from the Fronte  Universitario
d’Azione Nazionale (FUAN) – had been taking part in the riots against Lama, at La
Sapienza,  Rome … In that interview,  I  was explaining how the ideology of the
movement of 1977 was much more a product of our own [right wing] world view,
than of the leftists’. The next day, our party branch had become a pole of attraction
for right wing militants all over Rome and Italy. Now, one must acknowledge that
we were dynamic and creative: we were curious about Pasolini,  we were eating
macrobiotic we were looking with interest at the artistic underground currents …
and we were making ourselves known! … As soon as I went to the central MSI 6
committee, people were mad at me: ‘for Christ sake, Biagio, the press is talking
more about you than about the party secretary!’ (Biagio Cacciolla cited in Rao 2009:
138–39)
Several themes that were consolidating within the left movements in those
years are prominent here as well: curiosity towards ‘heretical figures’ of
the left,  interest in countercultures, attention to nature and food cultures
coming from the East and – most of all – a sort of antagonism between the
actors of grassroots politics and correspondent established political actors.
Later  on  in  1977,  some  militants  of  FUAN  also  appropriated  the
‘foundational breakup’ of the left and constituted an alternative genealogy
in which the ‘Lama episode’ was inspired by an earlier one, which had
happened about a decade before within the right-wing circle.
One day, in Piazza del Popolo, somebody wrote a sentence on a wall, which became
the symbol of that season of ours: Caradonna, 1968, Lama 1977. FUAN was the
signature, followed by a Celtic cross. (Biagio Cacciolla cited in Rao, 2009: 139)
The name of Giulio Caradonna is known thanks to this episode. In 1968, some
of the students from the extreme right had decided – against the advice of MSI
– to take part in the universities’ occupation all together with students of the
left. On 16 March, Giulio Caradonna was the MP of MSI to lead hundreds of
neo-fascist  batterers  in  a  gigantic  brawl  with  students,  which  would  force
younger occupants from left and right to leave the premises of the university.
For Cacciolla and his associates, this episode would constitute an antecedent to
the ‘Lama event’. Here – once again – the distinctions between left and right
were  obscured  in  favour  of  a  stronger  opposition  between  grassroots
movements and instituted political powers.
Another informant explicitly told me about ‘a generational accord for
the struggle against the system’, and then brought up again their own little
‘Lama episode’:
Many started accusing the MSI of being unable to handle [the situation] any longer
… I don’t remember precisely … it was after Acca Larentia,7 or after another one of
those violent deaths [of our militants]. We all went to the party [MSI] headquarters
via Alessandria,  and we basically smashed up … we destroyed the party branch
beating the crap out of  people there,  understand?! Because they clearly couldn’t
protect us any more … I mean, I was troubled myself [by what we did], it felt unfair,
but on the other hand …you had to unleash your anger against somebody, and –
politically speaking– those people were our fathers, after all, they were responsible
for us and to us … so to whom are you going to turn to? … I mean: our family was
destroyed … this  is  important:  because our  family,  to  us,  were the [neo-fascist]
comrades, the camaraderie … (P., interview, 2010)
In all  of those cases, disintegrating patterns of internal solidarity within
established ideological universes seem to trigger a rather violent process of
fragmentation  of  larger  factions  into  smaller  political  segments,  and  to
generate conflict among those. A general feature of this conflict was the
breakdown  of  authority  structures  within  political  fields,  and  the
subsequent transformation of internal logics of political opposition. Quite
suddenly,  ideological  dispute  ceased  being  monopolized  by the  conflict
between  traditional  political  opponents,  which  followed  the  horizontal
scheme  of  confrontation  ‘left  vs.  right’.  Instead,  smaller  and  culturally
defined  units  started  to  proclaim their  autonomy from their  established
institutional  representatives,  on the basis  of  having  a  radically  different
relationship to ‘lived reality’. To their minds, established political actors
were living in a different world of privileges and were no longer able to
protect or represent instances from lower social orders. Old friends became
new adversaries, following a vertical axis of internal opposition between
‘grassroots’ and ‘established’ political actors of the same faction.
Spontaneismo and the Uncanny Effects of Fragmentation
This transition from horizontal to vertical oppositions points us to the right
direction  in  understanding  larger  and  more  general  transformations  that
were probably underlying the ‘post-ideological’ turn of grassroots radical
movements. The breakdown of structures of authority within the left was
directly connected to the crisis of its project: after a decade of economic
regression and stagnation, ‘progress’ and ‘developmentalism’ had become
increasingly  difficult  to  sustain  as  the  underpinnings  of  a  political
enterprise.  With  the growth  of  inequalities  and social  exclusion,  ‘social
justice’ was also on the wane, while the aftermath of elections in 1976 had
made it  clear to everyone that  the participation of PCI in  governmental
action would wield no positive influence whatsoever. In other words, it
appeared  to  many  that  the  lobbies  and  established  political  elite  were
taking  control  and  mitigating  the  influence  of  the  left,  rather  than  the
reverse.
Just a few years earlier, Pasolini’s metaphor of ‘Il Palazzo’ (the palace),
describing  the  self-referentiality  and  inaccessibility  of  the  corridors  of
power,  had started to  gain enormous success every-where outside those
corridors.  But  when  the  crisis  of  the  left  became  evident,  or  –  more
precisely – when it became evident that the left was being integrated within
the logics of vertical power, rather than the contrary, the arrogance of the
political  class  was  laid  bare,  and  allowed  to  continue  unchallenged.
Grassroots  militants  from left  and right  began to  feel  betrayed by their
institutional representa-tives – as we have seen – and engaged in internal
conflict.  The  result  was  a  widespread  fragmentation  of  political
organizations  with  the  proliferation  of  grassroots  movements,  generally
prone to violence, and opposed to both left and right established actors.
The  constitution  of  Spontaneismo,  and  its  ‘neither  left  nor  right’
attitude, seems to be a sub-product of this process of rearticulation of the
logics  of  political  reproduction  within  the  Italian  system.  The  slow
disintegration  of  ties  of  political  solidarity  within  party  orga-nizations
called for new formations, new alliances and new ideolog-ical postulations.
The main groups within the Spontaneista galaxy were Costruiamo l’Azione
(CLA),8 founded in 1978, Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR)9 , founded
in 1979, and Terza Posizione (TP),10 also founded in 1979. All three were
animated in their political pas-sions by a strong, unmediated refusal of the
political system as a whole and,  at  the same time, by the desire  for an
alliance with the extreme left, in order to fight together the political elite.
In 1978, for example, Costruiamo L’Azione group declared on its fanzine:
We recognise our  former mistakes and we are  saying to  leftists:  wake up boys!
Don’t let them fuck you again, haven’t you been the trained monkeys of the state for
long enough? … Our enemies are the same and they all gang up against us, let’s
fight the filthy shit-hole together! (Anonymous, Costruiamo l’Azione, April 1978, n.
I, p. 1, my emphasis)
While offering alliances to the radicals, young Spontaneista militants appeared 
disappointed by the ‘betrayal’ of the institutional left:
Only dull minded people would not realize, at this point, that the left-wing front …
is  substantially  siding  with  the  [instituted  party]  system,  since  they  have  fully
become a part of it. (Costruiamo L’Azione, April 1978, n. I, p. 3)
Third Position, on the other hand, indicated by its own name the will to
overcome  the  distinctions  between  left  and  right,  in  favour  of  a  total
identification  with  ‘the  people’,  of  which  they  claimed  to  be  the  only
authentic representative.
Of all three groups, NAR was the more radical, and somehow a little
different. It had consolidated as a group around the leadership of Valerio
Fioravanti,  who was considered the ‘military leader’ of the Spontaneista
circle. They were all about violence and launched their ‘political career’
with the cold-blooded killing of a number of leftist militants, among other
innocent  people.  Nevertheless,  in  a  second strand  of  their  campaign  of
terror, their targets seemed to change. Policemen and judges were killed, to
demonstrate that the state was the enemy they were going for. Fioravanti
himself started to preach for putting aside the struggle against leftists, who
were fighting the same enemy, and thus had become potential allies.
Next to these more established groups, the neo -fascist circle, however
small  in  numbers,  exploded  in  the  late  70s  into  a  nebula  of  small
organizations, micro communities and temporary cells. All of these were a
real expression of the process of fragmentation by which non -established
groups multiplied and engaged in an intense activity of boundary-making
and endo-social practices. Especially the more violent groups renounced
any  kind  of  unnec-essary  relationship  to  the  exterior,  wanting  to  hang
around only with the members of  the in-group. But also more peaceful
expe-riences  like  the  Comunità  Organiche  di  Popolo  (People’s  Organic
Communities), in which some Spontaneista got involved, were basically
self-referential  and  represented  a  trend  of  disinvolvement  from  larger
segments of social life.
This breakaway from society and sociality seems to have repre-sented
for my informants – at least initially – a certain degree of satisfaction and
security in a world in which difference was becom-ing threatening. In this
sense,  this  general  fragmentation  of  political  identities  implied  also  a
fragmentation  of  space:  the  Spontaneista  had  a  very  clear  map  of  the
Roman neighbourhoods where they could circulate safely as opposed to
those controlled by ‘enemies’ or members of rival groups, where right -
wingers, or even just people who looked like them, would run a serious
risk of being beaten or shot. This was, of course, also true in reverse: the
Spontaneista killed several young militants of the left,  just because they
had been spotted circulating in a right-wing controlled neighbourhood.
Political struggle, at that stage, was no longer considered to be about
enacting  a  left-  or  right-wing  social  project  by  taking  control  of
administrative institutions. The declared goal was to fight the institutional
order itself, or, at least, to escape its gravitational field: its norms, rules and
impositions.
From ‘Class for Itself’ to ‘Class in Itself’: Vertical 
Reproduction of Power, and the Rise of Violence
All of these groups were – in fact – denouncing a general verticalization of
the ways in which power was practised and exercised in the society of their
day.  But,  curiously,  their  refusal  to  identify  with  traditional  ideological
distinctions such as ‘left and right’ appeared to reflect trends of political
convergence among instituted parties. Parties engaged in numerous trans-
ideological alliances even though they did not always explicitly seek to
overcome  existing  differences  between  left  and  right.  The  so  called
‘Governo di Unità Nazionale’,11 the ‘Compromesso Storico’12 between DC
and PCI, the ‘Arco Costituzionale’ against extremism,13 all represented – to
the eyes of my informants – political embodiments of this trans-ideological
tendency of the established elite. These were all publicly justified by the
need  to  federate  against  violence,  where  ‘violence’  usually  meant  the
Spontaneista people, or radical groups from the left. If it is true that these
groups were often actually violent, one must also acknowledge that their
criticism of political power struck sometimes quite close to the truth.
According to a plurality of  accounts (Asor Rosa 1977; Lanaro 1992;
Crainz  2003),  the  mechanisms  of  political  representation  were  in  fact
substantially eroded already in late 70s Italy: the once dif-ferent segments
of political society had been assimilated into one another and categories
like  left  and  right  were  becoming  increas-ingly  irrelevant.  As  two
observers  had  already  noted  in  1974,  it  had  become  very  difficult  ‘to
distinguish a Social Democrat from a Christian Democrat, a Communist
from a Socialist, and even certain given Liberals from certain weakened
Marxists’ (Scalfari and Turani 1974: 9).
Chantal  Mouffe  (2005)  has  analysed  a  similar  kind  of  transi-tion  in
relation  to  much more  recent  times.  Mouffe  indicates  that  a  movement
towards ‘a post-adversarial’ mode of politics has been supported not only
by the political convergence (and sometimes alliance) of the institutional
left and right, but also by academic ban-ner- men of the ‘Third Way’ like
Anthony  Giddens  and  Ulrich  Beck.  The  result  is  the  ‘incapacity  of
traditional  parties  to  provide  distinc-tive  forms  of  identification  around
possible alternatives’ (Mouffe: 2005: 55, but see also Žižek 2000).
The  convergence  of  the  political  antagonisms  towards  an  undif-
ferentiated centre had an unforeseen consequence – that is, the pro-gressive
exclusion (and successive alienation) of those ‘marginals’ of the political
system that were once included in a much more far-reaching mechanism of
political  representation.  This  was  actu-ally  deliberate  in  the  Italian  70s,
where this kind of rearrangement even had a name. ‘Opposti Estremismi’
(opposed extremisms) was known as the logic according to which the more
violent and radical the extreme, non-institutionalized wings of the political
arena, the more likely the forces occupying the institutional centre would
be  to  keep  their  electoral  basis  and  to  consolidate  their  interests  and
privileges by reassuring a frightened middle class.14
This seems to be the context in which ‘neither left nor right’ ideas and
ideologies  find  meaningfulness  and  political  momentum.  They,  in  fact,
bypass  the  trap  of  opposed  extremisms  by  declaring  the  dichotomy
‘right/left’  obsolete  and  channelling  the  emotionality  of  their  critique
against the political establishment as a whole. They establish themselves in
the political arena – quite paradoxically, one could say – as responses to
the  uniformization  of  political  and  social  differences  between  the
established left and right. Their aim is to collect the support of those left
out by the shrinking mechanism of representation. These groups claim to
represent a ‘post-ideological’ form of politics that is curiously similar to
the political convergence of the parties they contest. Nevertheless, if the
former promote a ‘post adversarial’ ideal, the latter rearticulate conflict and
heated forms of political opposition as their basic operational modes.
As Italy shows, this particular realignment of power is not new in itself
and tends to  appear in  socially  and historically  situated cir-cumstances.
Looking at these would allow us to make the connec-tion with particular
social  and  economic  transformations  that  might  be  involved  in  the
formation  to  these  political  epiphenomena.  In  this  regard,  what  Mouffe
fails to grasp – while focusing only on the political level – is that there are
social processes of class transformation underlying the political transition
to the ‘post-ideological mode’; I believe the early case of Italy helps us
make these processes more visible.
Again in one of the ‘Costruiamo l’Azione’ mimeographs, we can read: ‘The
masters Agnelli and Berlinguer, along with their servants, are plotting together
to  criminalize  every  substantial  opposition’  (Anonymous,  Costruiamo
l’Azione,  April  1978,  n.  I,  p.  1).  Identified  with  ‘the  masters’  here,  are
Berlinguer, the general secretary of the PCI, and Agnelli, the owner of Fiat (the
biggest industry in the country),  and later president of the Confederation of
Industrialists. It is important to note that the quote is not simply a denunciation
of the connivance between people that are meant to represent left and the right.
In that case, Andreotti (then the Christian Democrat Prime Minister backed
by the Communist Party), and not Agnelli, would be standing together with
Berlinguer.  The  condemnation  of  an  alli-ance  between  the  major
industrialist of the country and the secretary of the major ‘working class
party’ decries, in fact, a relevant trans-formation of class interests. These
are  articulated  through  politi-cal  positionalities  that  were  once  (but  are
clearly  not  any  longer)  considered  to  be  the  expression  of  solidarities
internal  to,  and  con-sistent  with,  class  structure.  But  to  denounce  the
betrayal of these internal solidarities is also to renounce them. The latter
mechanism  seems,  thus,  to  implicate  the  dis-  integration  and  dis-
articulation of the internal sodalities of class, at least at the representational
level. It is a process that opens up symbolic room and opportunities for the
formation  of  inter-  class  and  intra-class  alliances  at  the  political  level,
ending up with the quite likely formation of class, subclass and intra-class
new clusterings.
In relation to the Italian case, Scalfari and Turani have noted how – in
those years – a commonality of interests between the ruling elite and the
liberal  bourgeoisie  had  created  a  ‘new  class’  that  they  termed  ‘state
bourgeoisie’. Massimo Paci gave a sociologically detailed description of
these new social formations:
The  industrial  bourgeoisie  has  attended  the  emergence  of  a  new  ‘financial
bourgeoisie’, with which it has only partially integrated. On the other hand, the latter
has engaged in a rather tight partnership – in terms of speculative business – with
the governmental political class, this one itself appearing to have recently become a
social class on its own terms. (Paci 1996: 701)
The obvious outcome of these processes of change is what Strathern has
described as a disintegration of the class paradigm, understood here as the
framework of social meaning upon which our socially situated ‘point of
view’  rests  (Strathern  1992:  142).  Wolf  has  shown  –  in  a  powerful
exploration of the relationships between power and meaning – how a new
social axiom (or ‘framework of meaning’, in Strathern’s terms) enters into
conflict with an old one and thereby it also challenges ‘the fundamental
categories that empower its dynamics’ (Wolf 1990: 593). In this sense, a
‘logico-aesthetic  [dis]-integration’  of  the  categorical  order  is  likely  to
mirror  the dis-integration of  class  sodalities,  and change the nature and
subject of more general discourses that animate social life.
In Italy, for example, reference to the ‘working class’, common during
the  70s,  seems  to  have  progressively  disappeared,  not  only  from  the
discourse  of  its  traditional  adversaries,  but  also  –  Guido Crainz  notes
(2003: 563) – from the narratives of the political left itself. More radical
groups,  especially  the  ones  derived  from  the  experience  of  Operaismo
(workerism, see above), had somehow tried to resist this tendency. They
were, in fact, attempting to for-mulate a more inclusive idea of ‘working
class’, where unemployed people, students, housewives and off the books
labour were also seen as its constitutive elements. However, the breakdown
of  authority  structures  within  the  internal  cosmos  of  the  left  (with  the
explosion  of  competition  between  different  segments  of  the  latter  and,
more  generally,  the  opposition  between  instituted  and  grass-roots
formations)  appeared  to  impede  the  transmission  of  instances  that  had
emerged ‘below’ to the upper – instituted – block. At the same time, even
within  the  extreme left,  competition  was  high,  and political  positioning
very  diverse.  Fringes  of  the  radical  groups  decided  on  armed  struggle,
whereas  other  fringes,  like  the  afore-mentioned  ‘creative  wing’,15 were
rechannelling the expression of their dissent into artistic performances and
lifestyles. In this con-fused situation, when the radical left tried to federate
and challenge PCI hegemony at the institutional level by taking part in the
1976 elections as a political party, it was faced with disastrous electoral
results.  Despite  the  enduring  success  of  the  theoretical  tools  that  the
workerist experience had produced, what was left of it as its off-spring of
political formations came, there at an end (Filippini 2011). Class struggle
seemed about to be won, but not  by those who had initiated it  in their
attempt to establish welfare rights and social jus-tice for ‘the people’.
The category of ‘the people’ was largely present in public dis-courses of
the 70s, but nowadays is nowhere to be found, claims the French journalist
Eric Conan. Not only in politics, but also when it comes to art, literature
and cinema, the ‘working class’, once almost over-represented as a subject,
has today basically disappeared (Conan 2004). Others have noted how ‘the
cultural and political removal of working classes [from public debates] has
permitted to establish the image of a pacified society, hegemonized by the
middle class  and fully consensual.  The invisibility of  the working class
evacuates the very idea of conflict’ (Guilluy 2010: 9).
‘Conflict’ is  then brought back into the public  sphere by the fury of
‘neither left nor right’ ideologists, with an animosity that one of the editors
of this collection has previously labelled – quoting Slavoj Žižek – as ‘the
return of the repressed’. ‘Class’ is, of course, the repressed:|  
The workings, effects, exploitations and humiliations of class are the repressed and
denied but never forgotten trauma that expresses itself in neo-nationalist populism,
as the wider public culture of neoliberal growth, gentrification, and cosmopolitan
class formation denies its denizens the availability of the language of class. (Kalb
2011: 14)
The latter process is also evident in the ethnographic record I was able to
collect  in  the  field.  ‘C.’  –  for  example  –  was  one  of  the  more  active
Spontaneistas in the late 70s, one of those who drove the whole scene into
a spiral of violence. In the effort of spelling out his life history, he shows
how the transformations of a world that is no longer organized around a
class-based paradigm triggered a significant rearticulation of the principles
through which a life is planned, thought of and lived through. This seems
to be true even for somebody like him, who clearly did not sit on the left
side of the political arena at that time.
the divide started between those who still  believed in ‘the future of labour’,  and
those who had begun to refuse this view. Among people of my age there was a kind
of opposition: … some believed that our society would have been functioning well
in any case, and thus they aimed at finding a girl, getting married as soon as they
could, and creating a family. Some others believed they could look at things in a
different way … On the one side, people felt free to do whatever they liked, or at
least they knew they had just to follow their own interests; whereas, on the other
side, people were still expecting things to always follow the same scheme, because
‘it is like that, it’s always been, and so it will be forever’. (C., interview)
The inability to identify with a future based on the expansion of labour
seems  to  be  pushing  life  structures  into  new shapes  and  organizational
principles.  C.’s  description  of  a  dichotomized  social  life,  based  on
generational difference, only confirms the fact that these variations are the
expression of a change in the logics of social and political reproduction of
the system. The class paradigm not only disappears from the discourse of
the younger ones, but is basically rejected by them, despite the fact that
they appear as the very victims of its dissolution. The predicament of the
younger generations becomes ‘to follow one’s own interests’– that is, to
engage in a process of individualization of interests, which they refuse to
frame in a class paradigm.
In this sense, the violence produced by Spontaneista groups (as well as
radicals on the left)  can be understood as the ‘class conflict’  minus the
class  paradigm:  an  aggressiveness,  in  Freudian  terms,  which  could  no
longer be expressed in an organized manner.
Conclusions
The  overgrowth  of  a  post-industrial  middle  class  coupled  with  the
progressive dis -integration of the remnants of the industrial working class
seems to have encouraged a process of dichotomization of social/political
identifications. Here the principal distinction is no longer related to one’s
position within the worlds of labour, but simply to having or not a stable
occupation, and thus ‘before being above or below in the social hierarchy,
one is included or excluded’ (Sue 1994: 219).
The political rearticulation of these processes of social transfor-mation
is one that claims to be not only a-political, but anti-political. Spontaneista
movements claimed to represent the end of ideologies and to have buried
politics. As our informant once mentioned to me, ‘the goal [of political
conflict] is no longer to get a higher salary, or to be integrated into a higher
system of privileges, but is an affir-mation of identity, … while at the same
time  representing  a  rupture  with  the  social  structure  in  its  totality’  (C.
interview, 15).
Identity, and the expression of the self, often interpreted as the enactment of
a lifestyle, a form of behaviour, a praxis, seem to over-rule class as a social
paradigm. As Holmes (2000) has shown, style can become an aestheticized
basis of solidarity in the wake of the dis-integration of larger axioms of social
behaviour. In this sense, I hope I was able to show how the proliferation of
‘styles’  as  markers  of  difference  is directly  related  to  the verticalization of
power and its logics of reproduction. They are,  of course, expressions of ‘a
fierce antagonism toward the respectable “settled” society amid which [their
practitioners]  live as  persecuted  aliens’  (Herbert  1991:  249),  but  are also a
source of satisfaction produced by the reintegration of impaired and alienated
subjects into larger fields of belonging.
The sociologist Marco Revelli also seems to see the verticalization of
politics as the origin of the ‘neither left nor right’ politics of the ‘Rakes
Movement’:
politics are banned from the order of the discourse. Too deep is the abyss that has
representatives  and  represented,  between  the  language  spoken  ‘above’  and  the
vernacular spoken ‘below’. Too vulgar has been the exodus of the left, of the entire
left, from the spaces of life. (Marco Revelli, Il Manifesto, 12.12.2013)
In  a  political  universe  in  which  lower  segments  of  society  do  not  feel
represented anywhere by those who are in power, class does not fit any
longer  as  the  social-organizational  paradigm through which  sovereignty
can be practised and articulated into politics. One could note – en passant –
how the slow disappearance of class as a relevant political category has
weirdly  corresponded  to  the  progressive  expansion  of  a  discourse  on
‘civility’. Since the 80s, the growing categorical hegemony of notions like
‘the  civil  society’,  ‘civil’  or  ‘human’  rights  seems  to  include  implicit
references  to  what  is  considered  ‘not’  to  be  so.  Once  again,  similar
processes were happening during the Italian 70s as well: the established
society defined itself more and more in opposition to an expanding domain
of alienated outsiders. Even one of the leaders of the Italian Communist
Party  (PCI),  for  example,  stated  in  1974 that  ‘out  of  the  party  system,
within  the  actual  social  reality  of  our  country,  there’s  nothing  but
authoritarianism and dictatorship’ (Cossutta 1974: 107).
Asor  Rosa  (1977)  foresaw  the  descent  of  these  processes  into
essentialized political categories, thereby establishing the repre-sentation of
politically situated alternatives as the expression of voices of ‘two different
societies’.  In  this  view,  the  ‘two  societies’  look  at  each  other  as  alien
entities, each threatening to disintegrate the other, in order to satisfy its
own needs. On the one hand, the established society of warranted people
recategorizes  its  own  drop-outs  and  outsiders  as  dangerous  criminals,
uncivil or undemocratic. On the other hand, the outsiders tend to federate
while reappropri-ating the category of ‘the people’ as a unifying symbol
capable of overcoming the old distinctions between left and right. As in the
opposite case, this also happens via a moral essentialization of the ‘other’
against which the unwarranted society defines itself: the established society
(Asor Rosa 1977: 63–68).
In this frame, the progressive renunciation of the possibility of playing
an adversarial conception of politics organized around class lines seems to
force changing structures of sociality into a polarized mode of behaviour
where social conflict and negotiation among peers are repressed by means
of moral classification of the adver-sary. This leads to a paralysis of the
‘adversarial  model  of  politics’  through  which  sovereignty  is  usually
negotiated and expressed in democratic systems (Mouffe 2005).
While generally subscribing to Mouffe’s analysis, I have tried to make
an argument against an understanding of these changes as simply political.
The  Italian  case  shows  how processes  of  social  ver-ticalization  are  not
separable from these political transformations. What we saw in Italy in the
70s (and I believe we increasingly see in the present day) is a process of
disintegration  of  life  structures  in  which  impaired  subjects  search  for
security  while  trying to  integrate  themselves  into  collectivities  that,  not
relying on class any longer, can only define themselves in aesthetic/cultural
terms.
To sum up, the crisis of the left in the Italian 70s triggered a process of
redefinition of  the mechanisms of social  reproduction in the entire political
system.  Specifically,  the  left’s  failure  to  represent  instances  from  lower
segments of the social ladder opened up space for a ver-ticalization of society
in which instituted powers found themselves no longer in need of legitimation
from  below.  This  created  in  turn  the  decline  of  class  as  the  paradigm
organizing political confrontations, on the one hand, while it fostered – on the
other – angers that could no longer be expressed through class politics. The
result,  yesterday  as  today,  appears  to  be  an  exclusive  logic  of  political
participation whose fundamental divide is between (those who see themselves
as) ‘established’ and ‘outsiders’ of the political system. Here, the very logic of
confrontation changes: it is not any longer about seeing one’s argument prevail
over the other’s, but about disqualifying the moral legitimacy of the other as an
interlocutor.
Within this context, both the established and outsiders tend to develop
logico-aesthetic apparatuses asserting the increasing irrel-evance of left and
right  categories,  while  producing  ‘neither  left  nor  right’  ideological
patterns  and  formations  (‘Third  Position’,  ‘The  Third  Way’,  the  ‘Neue
Mitte’, etc.). As we have seen, ‘neither left nor right’ politics succeed in
erasing the class paradigm (and, pro-gressively, class consciousness) from
public debates, but also seem to enhance processes of fragmentation of the
social/political  world,  where  emotionally  charged  systems  of
incommensurable  values  divide  rich  and  poor,  rooted  and  uprooted
(Holmes 2000: 112).
There – to my mind – lies the problem with these ideologies, be they
grassroots or instituted: the incommensurability of diversity they end up
postulating makes mutual recognition impossible and political negotiation
vain, leaving violence (be it symbolic, physi-cal, or even just ideological)
as a dangerous option looming in the background.
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Notes
1. ‘Neither left nor right: we’re only free minds’.
2. ‘Fuck-off Day’.
3. For a bright example of these postulations see one of the foundational texts of the Italian new
right: Tarchi, Solinas and Veneziani (1982). In relation to the constitution of fascist ideology,
Sternhell has analysed the ‘post-ideological’ dimension of political discourses in Sternhell
(1987 [1983]) and Sternhell, Sznajder and Asheri (1989).
4. Democrazia Cristiana (DC).
5. These had already had a long history of militancy within the area of the left. Since the mid
50s, in  fact,  after  the disclosure of Stalinist  crimes by the secretary Khrushchev and the
violent repression of Hungarian revolt had exposed the authoritarian shadows of Sovietic
communism, non-aligned political and intellectual formations had started to emerge within
the Italian left. Central among these had been the journal ‘Quaderni Rossi’ (Red Notebooks,
first published in 1961) and the group of militant intellectuals that animated it, a current of
thought that subsequently became known as Operaismo (Workerism). A second journal –
named ‘Classe Operaia’ (Working Class) – had originated from the former in 1963. This
journal, and the people who gravitated around it, was the basis for what then became one of
the prominent leftist organizations of the Italian early 70s: Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power).
After  the  historical  experience  of  Potere  Operaio  ended,  in  1973,  a  new formation  was
constituted from the ashes of the former: ‘Autonomia Operaia’ (Workers Autonomy), which
was active mostly in the later part of the decade and was led by people who had been active
in Potere Operaio (Oreste Scalzone, Franco Piperno) or both Potere Operaio and – before that
– Quaderni Rossi (Toni Negri). Autonomia was actually a crucial segment of the organized
protest that had chased the CGIL secretary Lama away from La Sapienza, in February 1977.
‘La  cacciata  di  Lama’  (The  Lama  Chase-away)  –  as  it  subsequently  became  known  –
triggered also a process of internal fragmentation within Autonomia Operaia, making what
was known as ‘ala creativa’ (the creative wing) more marginal, whereas more radicalized
elements clamoured for the need to raise the level of conflicts (by which many meant a call
to  armed  struggle).  The  seminal  experience  of  the  ‘Red  Notebooks’  generated  another
organization, ‘Potere Operaio Toscano’ (Tuscany’s Workers’ Power), which was created in
1966 around the charismatic figure of Adriano Sofri. This was later to become the funding
group of Lotta Continua  (Continuous Struggle),  which would be – throughout all  of the
Italian 70s – the largest and most important formation of the radical left.
6. Movimento Sociale Italiano was the extreme right party in Italy, founded in 1946; many of
its active members had previous connections to Mussolini’s fascist party. For an articulate
history, see Ignazi (1998).
7. Acca Larentia was a foundational event in the history of Spontaneismo. On 7 January 1978, two
young  MSI  militants  were  ambushed  and  killed  by  a  supposedly  left-wingcommando  while
getting out of a MSI party branch via Acca Larentia. Hours later, after the whole roman right-
wing circle had gathered on the spot, riots arose in the neighbourhood, and a third militant
was shot and killed by the police. The event collapsed old enemies and old friends into a
single threat, and young neo-fascists reacted violently, committing a series of murders that
targeted both the state and the left.
8. Let’s Build the Action.
9. Armed Revolutionary Squads.
10. Third Position.
11. ‘Government  of  national  unity’  was  the  government  of  1976,  when  the  PCI  eventually
supported a Christian Democrat cabinet hoping that majority and opposition would federate
against the terrorist violence that was proliferating wildly throughout the country.
12. ‘Historical Compromise’ was the offer of a political collaboration that the Communist Party
made in 1973 to the long standing adversaries of DC. The idea of a less confrontational
attitude  between  the  two  major  Italian  parties  was  guided  by  communist  fears  of  an
authoritarian turn in the country (as it had been the case in Chile that very year, and would be
one year later in Greece). The Compromesso eventually concretized in the 1976 government
of national unity, and – before that – brought the two parties to less hostile political positions
for half a decade.
13. ‘Gathering of constitutional parties’: it referred to the block of forces who had participated to
the redaction of the Constitution. These were – of course – all the established parties of the
time (with the exception of the neo-fascist MSI), and thus the expression implicitly excluded
the grassroots movements that had emerged during the late 60s and 70s. Mention of the Arco
Costituzionale generally implied a negative reference to the forces this expression excluded,
which implicitly stood out as less civilized or democratic.
14. There were, of course, enormous differences in political behaviour between the parties at
stake, and especially – I must specify – between the PCI and the rest. PCI remained, in many
ways, the institutionalized political force representing the working class, and – somehow – its
morality  trumped  that  of  the  other  established  formations  of  the  political  spectrum.
Nevertheless, a tendency of PCI to lose contact with its electoral basis was present in the
minds  of  many.  It  seems  quite  intuitive  that  the  rupture  between  the  PCI  and  leftist
movements  subsequently  pushed  the  former  to  increasingly  give  up  dialogue  with  non-
instituted realities.
15. This  included  small  formations  like  ‘Indiani  Metropolitani’  (the  Metropolitan  Indians),
similar  to  the  German contemporary phenomenon of  Stadtindianer,  or  the  visionary ‘Gli
Uccelli’ (The Birds). These groups were often composed of people disguising themselves by
using symbols of nature, thereby trying to translate their criticism of the political system as a
whole into an ‘expressionist’ politics of life (in ways that are not dissimilar to Isaiah Berlin’s
use of this term 1976: 153). Politics were here translated into an act of art – of rebellion; they
were aestheticized into the theatrical representation of one’s own alterity to ‘the system’.
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